There has been considerable debate as to whether the revenue-neutral substitution of environmental taxes for ordinary income taxes might offer a double dividend: not only (1) improve the environment but also (2) reduce certain costs of the tax system. This paper articulates different notions of double dividend and examines the theoretical and empirical evidence for each. It also connects the double-dividend issue with principles of optimal environmental taxation in a second-best setting.
Economists have long favored the use of taxes as instruments of environmental protection. To many economic analysts, in situations involving serious externalities taxes are the most effective mechanism for "getting the prices fight' '--that is, for helping prices closely approximate marginal social costs. The notion that taxes can improve welfare outcomes by internalizing externalities traces back at least as far as Pigou (1938) and is a central tenet of environmental economics.
Real-world economies obtain public revenues not only through environmental (corrective) taxes but also through distortionary taxes such as income, payroll, and sales taxes. What constitutes getting the prices right (or merely closer to right) is more complicated in a second-best setting where both types of taxes are present than in a world with environmental taxes alone. This is the case for at least two reasons. First, taxes interact. In particular, the gross costs x of newly imposed environmental taxes depend on the marginal rates of preexisting distortionary taxes. 2 Second, the presence of other taxes introduces the possibility of swapping an environmental tax for an existing tax. Consider a tax reform in which an environmental tax is introduced and its revenues are used to finance reductions in the income tax. The overall gross cost of this revenue-neutral package depends not only on the costs attributable to the environmental tax itself but also on certain efficiency benefits (avoided costs) associated with the reduction in income tax rates. 3 LAWRENCE H. GOULDER These issues have come to life in recent analyses and policy debates surrounding the carbon tax option. Initial work on carbon taxes tended to ignore other distortionary taxes; most initial studies assumed that the revenues from this tax would be returned to the economy in a lump-sum fashion. 4 Subsequent analysis pointed out, however, that the revenues could be used to finance reductions in ordinary, distortionary taxes. 5 Several analysts have indicated that this could significantly reduce the costs of the carbon tax. Indeed, some have suggested that these costs could be zero or negative when opportunities to recycle the revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes are taken into account. However, some recent theoretical and empirical work points out an effect that works in the opposite direction, revealing ways that existing distortionary taxes may interact with the carbon tax and thereby enlarge the carbon tax's costs. While recognizing that recycling the revenues can reduce the costs of a carbon tax, this work shows that for any given method of recycling, preexisting taxes augment the costs. Much of this work indicates that this tax interaction effect is larger than the revenue-recycling effect, so that, overall, a revenue-neutral carbon tax is likely to involve positive costs in a second-best setting.
The term double dividend relates directly to these discussions. Pearce (1991) noted that swaps of environmental taxes for distortionary taxes may produce a double dividend by not only (1) discouraging environmentally damaging activities but also (2) reducing the distortionary cost of the tax system. The double-dividend concept is relevant to many important ideas in second-best environmental taxation. Unfortunately, the term is used in different ways: the dividend given by (2) above, in particular, can have very different interpretations. This has led to some confusion. This paper distinguishes the different notions of double dividend and analyzes the theoretical and empirical support for each. The main motivation here is not to develop a taxonomy but rather to clarify key issues relevant to the formulation of environmental policy in second-best economies. The discussion is intended to help delineate the circumstances under which the substitution of green or environmentally motivated taxes for typical existing taxes is likely to be an efficiency-improving venture.
Before launching into the specifics of the double-dividend issue, it may be useful to view the issue in a broader context. There is widespread agreement as to the ability of environmental taxes to confer the first dividend above (environmental improvement), although the magnitude of this dividend usually is highly uncertain. On the other hand, there is much debate as to what kind of additional (second) dividend, if any, might be offered by environmental taxes. The preoccupation with the possibility of a second dividend, in my view, reflects the uncertainties about the magnitudes of the first. Much of the controversy about the second dividend is in terms of whether environmental taxes can be introduced in a way that is costless. Policymakers who are interested in green tax swaps are often frustrated by the uncertainties as to the values of the environmental benefits that would result from such swaps. Under these conditions, the no-cost idea is especially appealing. If revenueneutral environmental tax policies are costless, then the burden of proof facing the policymaker is much reduced: to justify the environmental tax on benefit-cost grounds, it suffices to know the sign of the environmental benefits--to know that they are positive. If costs are zero (or negative), this guarantees positive net benefits. On the other hand, if one cannot be assured that the costs are zero, then before one can recommend an environmental tax swap on efficiency grounds one has to be involved in the messy business of comparing (uncertain) environmental benefits with the economic costs.
